As the complexity of real-world systems continues to increase, so does the need for distributed protocols that are capable of guaranteeing a satisfactory system performance, without the reliance on centralized decision making. In this respect, game theory provides a valuable framework for the design of distributed algorithms in the form of equilibrium efficiency bounds. Arguably one of the most widespread performance metrics, the price-of-anarchy measures how the efficiency of a system degrades when moving from centralized to distributed decision making. While the smoothness framework -introduced in [1] -has emerged as a powerful methodology for bounding the price-of-anarchy, the resulting bounds are often conservative, bringing into question the suitability of the smoothness approach for the design of distributed protocols. In this paper, we introduce the notion of generalized smoothness in order to overcome these difficulties. First, we show that generalized smoothness arguments are more widely applicable, and provide tighter price-of-anarchy bounds compared to those obtained using the existing smoothness framework. Second, we show how to leverage the notion of generalized smoothness to obtain a tight characterization of the price-of-anarchy, relative to the class of local cost-sharing games. Within this same class of games we show that the price-of-anarchy can be computed and optimized through the solution of a tractable linear program. Finally, we demonstrate that our approach subsumes and generalizes existing results for three well-studied classes of games.
Introduction
With the advent of large-scale multiagent systems, in, e.g., transportation networks [2, 3] and power grids [4] , no central coordinator will be able to dictate the actions of individual agents while adhering to the stringent constraints imposed by their size, security requirements, and limited communication. A promising alternative is the use of decentralized protocols, in which the local decision-making components harmoniously achieve some predefined global objective, while satisfying the requirements for scalability, privacy and communication overhead. Distributed algorithms have been successfully designed and deployed in many different engineering applications, including -but, not limited to -distributed computation [5] , multirobot control [6] , cryptography [7] , and congestion management in large-scale networks [8] .
A popular and effective method for deriving efficient distributed protocols consists of designing a centralized algorithm, that is later distributed by leveraging the structure of the problem considered, * A manuscript containing preliminary results will appear in the proceedings of the 2019 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, under the title "When Smoothness is not Enough: Toward Exact Quantification and Optimization of the Price-of-Anarchy". This work is supported by ONR grant #N00014-17-1-2060, NSF grant #ECCS-1638214, and SNSF grant #P2EZP2 181618. see e.g., [9, 10] . Complementary to this design philosophy, our work focuses on the so-called game design approach [11, 12] wherein the local decision-making processes are not designed explicitly. Instead, the design of distributed protocols emerges as the result of two steps: utility design, and learning design [13] . First, the interactions of the system's agents are modelled as a strategic form game in which the local decision-making components are the players, and each player is associated with a permissible set of actions as well as with a utility function. Second, each agent is assigned a local learning rule that specifies its dynamical behaviour in response to the available local information. The outcome of the game-theoretic approach is a distributed algorithm that is asynchronous, robust, and scalable, with performance certificates in the form of bounds on the efficiency of emergent equilibria. One practical equilibrium efficiency bound is the so-called priceof-anarchy [14] , which represents the worst-case ratio between the cost of an equilibrium and the optimal cost. While other metrics are equally important (e.g., transient performance), improving our ability to characterize and optimize the price-of-anarchy remains central to the advancement of the game design approach. The focus of this work lays on the first step of the game-theoretic approach: utility design, where we utilize the price-of-anarchy as the resulting performance metric. In this respect, the primary objective of this paper is to answer the two following questions:
• How can we quantify the price-of-anarchy of a given class of games?
• How can we design the agents' cost/utility functions so as to optimize the price-of-anarchy?
Many works use utility design to derive incentive mechanisms, and to improve efficiency guarantees in multiagent systems, in a variety of contexts, including congestion in traffic networks [15, 16] , minimum set cover [17, 18] , server load-balancing [19] , assignment of credit in teams [20] , and list decoding [21] . While the study of learning design is a vast and vital area of research, see e.g., [22, 23] , it falls outside the scope of this paper.
Our Contributions
Our main contributions can be summarized in four parts.
1. We define a new notion of smoothness, which we call generalized smoothness (Definition 1), and show how it automatically yields upper-bounds on the price-of-anarchy (Theorem 1). We demonstrate that the efficiency bounds obtained using generalized smoothness arguments are tighter, in general, than those derived using traditional smoothness techniques. Additionally, we show that generalized smoothness arguments are applicable to classes of games for which traditional smoothness techniques are inadmissible. Finally, we prove that generalized smoothness arguments tightly characterize the efficiency of average coarse-correlated equilibria in all classes of games (Theorem 2).
2. We show that generalized smoothness arguments tightly characterize the price-of-anarchy for local cost-sharing games (Theorem 3). As a consequence, we are able to construct tractable linear programs to compute the price-of-anarchy (Theorem 4), as well as to derive utilities that optimize the price-of-anarchy (Theorem 5) within such games. We have prepared MATLAB ® and Python code that solves these linear programs. 1 3. We show that all of the results in this work extend to the setting of welfare-maximization games, and present their analogues in Theorems 6 to 9.
4. For three well-studied classes of games, we demonstrate that generalized smoothness arguments can be used to subsume and generalize well-known results.
Related Works
The characterization and optimization of the price-of-anarchy as a performance metric in distributed resource-allocation has recently received significant interest [24, 25, 26, e.g.] . One of the difficulties in analyzing the price-of-anarchy, as originally defined in [14] , stems from the multiplicity of equilibria as a result of unsplittable (atomic) player demand. Many past works have focused on the continuous-flow (nonatomic) approximation of this problem, where uniqueness of equilibrium is often guaranteed. In nonatomic setups, numerous tight price-of-anarchy bounds and optimal mechanisms have been derived [27, 28, 29, e.g.] . This work analyzes the price-of-anarchy of atomic resource-allocation problems, and explicitly addresses the multiplicity of equilibria. A well-established method for obtaining price-of-anarchy bounds in the atomic setting leverages the so-called smoothness framework. This approach [30, 31] has not only proven useful when characterizing the performance of broad classes of equilibria [32, 33, e.g.] , it has also been applied to a variety of problems, including learning [34] , and mechanism design [35] . Unfortunately, as observed in [36, Thm. 1] , the traditional smoothness argument finds limited applicability in connection to the utility design problems considered in this work. Generalized smoothness is tailored to resolve this weakness, while retaining all the strengths of traditional smoothness.
The notion of generalized smoothness presented in this work is most similar to the style of argument used in [17, 18] to quantify the price-of-anarchy of covering problems. More specifically, this work builds upon the results in [36, 37] , where the authors develop a linear programming framework for characterizing and optimizing the efficiency of pure Nash equilibria in a well-studied class of resource-allocation games. The notion of generalized smoothness, introduced here for the first time, permits a non-trivial extension of their framework: we are now able to construct linear programs for computing and optimizing the (average) coarse-correlated equilibrium efficiency, relative to a broader class of problems, including the well-studied classes of congestion games [38, 39] , and probabilistic-objective games [40, 20] .
While linear programming approaches for computing the price-of-anarchy appeared in [41, 42] , [41] considers weighted congestion games, a distinct class of problems from those considered in this work. Additionally, the techniques introduced in both these works can not be used to compute the price-of-anarchy of a class of games in a tractable fashion. In stark contrast, the linear programs derived in this work are tractable. Our gains in tractability come from a non-trivial game parametrization by which a given game instance can be described with O(n 3 ) numbers, where n is the number of players in the game.
Cost-Minimization Games

Model
We consider a class of cost-minimization problems where we are given a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, and each agent i ∈ N must select an action a i from a finite set A i . The system cost induced by an allocation a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A = A 1 × · · · × A n is measured by the function C : A → R >0 . The objective is to find an optimal allocation, i.e., a opt ∈ arg min a∈A C(a).
(1)
The focus of this work is on deriving near-optimal distributed solutions to the optimization in (1) .
In particular, we consider the framework of cost-minimization games as the game-theoretic model for the class of cost-minimization problems defined above. A cost-minimization game G is defined by a player set N , in which each player i ∈ N evaluates its choice a i ∈ A i using a local cost function
We represent a cost-minimization game as defined above as a tuple G = (N, A, C, J ), where J = {J 1 , . . . , J n }.
Equilibrium model and performance metrics
In the forthcoming analysis, we will focus on the solution concept of pure Nash equilibrium 2 , which is defined in cost-minimization games as any allocation a ne ∈ A such that,
where a −i = (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ). For a given instance G, let NE(G) denote the set of all allocations a ∈ A that satisfy (2) . Under the assumption that the set NE(G) is non-empty, we define the price-of-anarchy of the game G as
The price-of-anarchy represents the ratio between the costs of the worst-performing pure Nash equilibrium in the game G, and the optimal allocation. For a given class of cost-minimization games G, which may contain infinitely many game instances, we further define the price-of-anarchy as,
Note that a lower price-of-anarchy corresponds to an improved performance, and PoA(G) = 1 means that all pure Nash equilibria of the game G are optimal.
Smoothness in Cost-Minimization Games
In this section, we review the notion of smooth games, and recall how this can be used to bound the corresponding price-of-anarchy. The cost-minimization game G is (λ, µ)-smooth [31] if n i=1 J i (a) ≥ C(a) for all a ∈ A, and if, for any two allocations a, a ′ ∈ A, there exist λ > 0 and µ < 1 satisfying
The price-of-anarchy of a (λ, µ)-smooth game G is upper-bounded as
Observe that if all the games in a class G are shown to be (λ, µ)-smooth, then the price-of-anarchy of the class PoA(G) is also upper-bounded by λ/(1 − µ). We refer to the best upper-bound obtainable using a smoothness argument on a given class of games G as the robust price-of-anarchy, i.e.,
Note that, the robust price-of-anarchy represents only an upper-bound on the price-of-anarchy, i.e. for any class of (λ, µ)-smooth games G, PoA(G) ≤ RPoA(G), and it could be PoA(G) < RPoA(G). A special and widely-studied class of cost-minimization games is that of congestion games, which we recall next.
Example 1 (Congestion games [38, 39] ). A congestion game is defined as a game G with player set N = {1, . . . , n} and set of resources R, where every player i ∈ N selects an action a i from its corresponding set of permissible actions A i ⊆ 2 R . Each resource r ∈ R has an associated latency function ℓ r : N → R. For a given allocation a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), the system cost, and player cost functions are defined as
Congestion games are a popular class of games that have found applications in settings ranging from traffic management [45] , to server load-balancing [19] .
Generalized Smoothness in Cost-Minimization Games
Generalized smoothness framework
In the following we introduce the notion of generalized smoothness. We show how generalized smoothness provides provably tighter price-of-anarchy bounds than traditional smoothness, and is applicable to a larger class of problems.
Definition 1 (Generalized smoothness). The cost-minimization game G is (λ, µ)-generalized smooth if, for any two allocations a, a ′ ∈ A, there exist λ > 0 and µ < 1 satisfying,
Note that we maintain the notation of (λ, µ) as in traditional smoothness for ease of comparison. In the specific case when n i=1 J i (a) = C(a) for all a ∈ A, the condition (7) is equivalent to the traditional smoothness condition in (5) . It is straightforward to observe that a (λ, µ)-generalized smooth game inherits a price-of-anarchy upper-bound of λ/(1 − µ), as formalized next. Theorem 1. The price-of-anarchy of a (λ, µ)-generalized smooth game G is upper-bounded as,
Proof. For all a ne ∈ NE(G) and a opt ∈ A,
The first inequality holds by (2) , and the second, by (7) . Rearranging (8), we get the result.
We define the generalized robust price-of-anarchy of a class of cost-minimization games G as the best upper-bound obtainable using a generalized smoothness argument, i.e.,
The proposition below highlights how generalized smoothness remediates several weaknesses of the traditional smoothness framework. In the following, we consider the case of n i=1 J i (a) ≥ C(a) for all a ∈ A solely to ensure that RPoA(G) is well-defined. Meanwhile, GPoA(G) and PoA(G) are well-defined irrespective of whether n i=1 J i (a) ≥ C(a), or n i=1 J i (a) < C(a). Proposition 1. Consider any cost-minimization game G such that n i=1 J i (a) ≥ C(a) for all a ∈ A. The following statements compare the price-of-anarchy PoA(G), the robust price-of-anarchy RPoA(G), and the generalized robust price-of-anarchy GPoA(G):
i. The generalized robust price-of-anarchy is always a better upper-bound on the price-of-anarchy than the robust price-of-anarchy, i.e., for any (λ, µ)-smooth game G,
ii. The price-of-anarchy, and generalized robust price-of-anarchy are shift-, and scale-invariant, i.e., for any given γ > 0 and (δ 1 , . . . , δ n ) ∈ R n ,
None of these properties hold for the robust price-of-anarchy.
iii. The robust price-of-anarchy is optimized by budget-balanced local cost functions, i.e., any set of local cost functions J
In general, this does not hold for PoA((N, A, C, J )), and GPoA((N, A, C, J )).
Proof. For a given game G = (N, A, C, {J i }), we define G ′ = (N, A, C, {γJ i + δ i }) for given γ > 0 and {δ i } n i=1 ∈ R n . Note that PoA(G) = PoA(G ′ ), since the definition of optimal allocation (1), and the equilibrium conditions (2) are shift-, and scale-invariant. Part ii. We begin by showing that GPoA(G) is shift-, and scale-invariant. For the game G, we define λ * > 0 and µ * < 1 as the optimal generalized smoothness parameters from (9), i.e. GPoA(G) = λ * /(1 − µ * ), and
Observe that the values {δ i } n i=1 ∈ R n cancel in the generalized smoothness condition, i.e.,
We are interested in parameters λ > 0 and µ < 1 that optimize the ratio λ/(1− µ), and that satisfy,
By (9) , the optimal choice of (λ, µ) is λ = λ * γ > 0, and µ = (µ * − 1)γ + 1 < 1. Thus, for any γ > 0, we obtain GPoA(G ′ ) = λ * /(1 − µ * ) = GPoA(G). Next, we show that RPoA(G) is neither shift-, nor scale-invariant. Let λ * > 0 and µ * < 1 be the optimal smoothness parameters from (6), i.e. RPoA(G) = λ * /(1 − µ * ). First, we consider how the robust price-of-anarchy responds to a shift, i.e., we fix γ = 1. We are interested in λ > 0 and µ < 1 such that,
Since the above condition grows stricter as the value of the left-hand side expression is increased,
where the above inequalities hold by (λ, µ)-smoothness, by (2), and by (5), respectively. Observe that, for 0 < γ < 1,
for all a ∈ A implies that any pair of (λ, µ) satisfying (5) necessarily satisfies (7), we note that the generalized robust price-of-anarchy is at least as strict an upper-bound as the robust price-of-anarchy, in general. Note that for any game
. We previously showed that the generalized robust price-of-anarchy GPoA(G ′ ) is less than or equal to the robust price-of-anarchy RPoA(G ′ ), and that the generalized robust price-of-anarchy is scale-invariant (i.e., GPoA(G) = GPoA(G ′ )). Thus,
Part iii. Given two sets of local cost functions J = {J 1 , . . . , J n } and J ′ = {J ′ 1 , . . . , J ′ n }, observe that the robust price-of-anarchy of the game G = (N, A, C, J ) is lower than, or equal to that
for all a ∈ A. This is because the smoothness condition (5) for G is less restrictive on values λ > 0, µ < 1, than for G ′ . Extending this reasoning, the smoothness condition (5) is least strict for choice of n i=1 J i (a) = C(a) for all a ∈ A, since any further decrease in n i=1 J i (a) will violate the condition n i=1 J i (a) ≥ C(a) for all a ∈ A. The above reasoning does not hold for the price-of-anarchy and generalized robust price-of-anarchy of a game G. In particular, the utility function that optimizes the price-of-anarchy and generalized robust price-of-anarchy in the class of covering games [17] is not budget-balanced [18, 46] .
Average coarse-correlated equilibria
Although conceptually simple, pure Nash equilibria can be intractable to find, or even nonexistent, in general. Fortunately, all performance bounds obtained in this work extend automatically to the more general class of average coarse-correlated equilibria, defined below.
Definition 2. For a given cost-minimization game G, we define an average coarse-correlated equilibrium as a probability distribution over the set of actions σ ∈ ∆(A) satisfying, for all a ′ ∈ A,
where σ a ∈ [0, 1] is the probability associated with action a ∈ A in the distribution σ.
Observe that this definition of average coarse-correlated equilibrium is a generalization of its first definition in [42] , as the two definitions are equivalent for any game G with n i=1 J i (a) = C(a) for all a ∈ A. Our notion of average coarse-correlated equilibrium is more natural, as it is independent of the system cost function like many other notions of equilibrium, e.g., pure Nash equilibrium, coarsecorrelated equilibrium. Note that the set of average coarse-correlated equilibria of a game contains all of the game's pure Nash equilibria, mixed Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria and coarsecorrelated equilibria [31, 42] . Here we show that the generalized robust price-of-anarchy tightly characterizes the average coarse-correlated equilibrium performance of any cost-minimization game G, and, thus, of any class of cost-minimization games G.
where the set ACCE(G) contains all the average coarse-correlated equilibria of the game G.
Proof. We observe that the first claim of this theorem follows directly from the second, and thus it is sufficient to prove only the second. This proof is adapted from [42, Thm. 2.7] for our generalized definition of average coarse-correlated equilibrium in (10) . Without loss of generality, we assume that the optimal allocation a opt ∈ A is known a priori. Any pair of parameters λ > 0, µ < 1 that solve (9) for G = {G} is also the solution to the following program:
Setting u = λ/(1 − µ) and v = 1/(1 − µ), this further simplifies to the following linear program
Taking the dual of the above linear program, and rescaling such that C(a opt ) = 1, we obtain the following equivalent linear program
where the rescaling is valid because C(a opt ) > 0 for the definition of price-of-anarchy. Observe that this last linear program is identical to the primal linear program for computing the worst-case average coarse-correlated equilibrium efficiency as in [42, Thm. 2.7] for the modified condition for average coarse-correlated equilibrium in (10).
Efficiency Guarantees in Local Cost-Sharing Games
Model
We consider a class of cost-minimization games, termed local cost-sharing games, that are widely studied in the existing literature [32, 19, 41, 25, e.g.] . A local-cost sharing game G consists of a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, and a finite set of resources R, where each resource r ∈ R has a cost function c r : N → R and a cost-generating function f r : N → R. Each player i ∈ N is associated with a given action set A i ⊆ 2 R , from which it selects an action a i ∈ A i . For a given allocation a ∈ A, the system cost and player cost functions are defined as
where |a| r = |{i ∈ N s.t. r ∈ a i }| represents the number of players selecting the resource r as part of their action in allocation a. With slight abuse of notation, we extend the definitions of the resources' cost functions such that c r (0) = 0 for all r ∈ R, for ease of presentation. We identify a local cost-sharing game with the tuple G = (N, R, A, {(c r , f r )}), where, to simplify notation, we have removed the subscripts from the above sets, i.e. we write
In many cases, we are interested in computing the price-of-anarchy for classes of local costsharing games. To that end, we define a scalable class of local cost-sharing games G n B , relative to a finite basis set B = {(c 1 , f 1 ), . . . , (c m , f m )}, as the set of all n-player local cost-sharing games in which, for every resource r ∈ R, there exists v r ≥ 0 such that,
for some pair (c, f ) ∈ B. Scalable classes of local cost-sharing games are widely studied in the existing literature. The most well-studied example of such games is congestion games, defined in Example 1. Indeed, a congestion game can be modelled as a local cost-sharing game where c e (x) = ℓ e (x) · x, and f e (x) = ℓ e (x), for all e ∈ E.
Affine congestion games [47, 48] . A special class of atomic congestion games is that of affine congestion games, in which the edge latency functions are restricted to the form ℓ e (x) = a e x + b e , for a e , b e ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E. The class of affine congestion games is equivalent to the scalable class of local cost-sharing games G n B , for choice of basis
Affine congestion games were among the first to prompt interest in equilibrium efficiency, and are shown to have price-of-anarchy equal to 5/2 in [47, 48] .
Polynomial congestion games [48, 32] . Similarly, the class of polynomial congestion games of order d ≥ 1 can be represented by the class G n B , with the basis set B = {(x, 1), . . . , (x d+1 , x d )}. Exact price-of-anarchy bounds for polynomial congestion games are obtained in [32] .
Tightness of generalized robust price-of-anarchy
While the robust price-of-anarchy matches the price-of-anarchy under the restrictive assumption that C(a) = n i=1 J i (a) for all a ∈ A [31] , the next theorem shows that the generalized robust price-of-anarchy is equal to the price-of-anarchy for any scalable class of local cost-sharing games G n B . This implies that the worst performing average coarse-correlated equilibrium is simply a pure Nash equilibrium. Therefore, PoA(G n B ) is a tight bound not only on the performance of pure Nash equilibria in G n B , but extends more broadly to the efficiency of all mixed Nash, coarse-correlated, and average coarse-correlated equilibria. Proof. We split the proof into the following steps, in part i) we construct an upper-bound on the generalized robust price-of-anarchy GPoA(G n B ), and in parts ii) and iii) we derive game instances with prices-of-anarchy that match this upper-bound, hence proving PoA(G n B ) = GPoA(G n B ). Part i): For any game G, we denote an optimal allocation as a opt , and a worst-performing Nash equilibrium as a ne , i.e. a ne ∈ NE(G) such that PoA(G) = C(a ne )/C(a opt ). For every resource r ∈ R, let x r = |a ne | r , and y r = |a opt | r . We define z r as the number of agents that select resource r in both a ne and a opt , i.e. z r := |{i ∈ N : r ∈ a ne i } ∩ {i ∈ N : r ∈ a opt i }|. We observe that using the above definitions of (x r , y r , z r ) for all r ∈ R, it follows for any game
Informally, if a player i ∈ N selects a given resource r ∈ R in both a ne i and a opt i , then by deviating from a ne i to a opt i , the player does not add to the load on r, i.e., |a opt i , a ne −i | r = |a ne | r = x r . However, if r ∈ a opt i and r / ∈ a ne i , then |a opt i , a ne −i | r = |a ne | r + 1 = x r + 1. Thus, the left-hand side of the generalized smoothness condition (7) can be written as
Note that for any game G ∈ G n B , z r ≤ min{x r , y r }, and 1 ≤ x r + y r − z r ≤ n. We define Observe that (λ, µ) ∈ S(G n B ) that satisfy the above conditions must satisfy the conditions for generalized smoothness (7) , because, by the reasoning in (13) , the generalized smoothness condition can be expressed as a sum of a subset of the conditions in (14) . Thus, the following represents an upper-bound on GPoA(G n B )
. We note that γ(G n B ) is an infimum and need not be attained. Thus, we split the rest of the proof between when γ(G n B ) is attained for some pair (λ,μ) ∈ S(G n B ) (part ii)) and when it is not (part iii)).
To conclude this part of the proof, we show that it is sufficient to define S(G n B ) over the set 
Let H b,(x,y,z) denote the set of (λ, µ) ∈ R >0 × R <1 that satisfy, for the given b, and (x, y, z),
We denote by δH b,(x,y,z) the boundary of the set, i.e. the points (λ, µ) that satisfy the above inequality with equality. Some simplifications can be made for the cases when either x = 0 or y = 0. When x = 0, then y > 0, z = 0, and the halfplane H b,(0,y,0) contains all λ ≥ f (1)y/c(y). When y = 0, then x > 0, z = 0, and the halfplane H b,(x,0,0) contains all µ ≥ 1 − xf (x)/c(x). For the halfplanes with x > 0 and y > 0, the boundary is,
Note that finding (λ,μ) such thatλ/(1 −μ) = γ(G n B ) is equivalent to finding the point along the boundary of ∩ B,I R (n) H b,(x,y,z) that is tangent to the line with µ-intercept equal to 1 and the most negative slope (see e.g., Fig. 1 ). Thus, we can find the optimal pair (λ, µ) by starting at the point λ = max t,y f t (1)y/c t (y) and µ = 1, then following the south-west boundary until we reach a line with µ-intercept less than or equal to 1. There are three possibilities for where the optimal pair (λ, µ) occur: at λ = max y f (1)y/c(y), at the intersection of two halfplane lines δH b,(x,y,z) and δH b ′ ,(x ′ ,y ′ ,z ′ ) with x, x ′ > 0, y, y ′ > 0, and z, z ′ ≥ 0, or at µ = 1 − min b∈B,x>0 xf (x)/c(x). For all three of these cases, there exists η ∈ [0, 1] such that,
where b = (c, f ) and (x, y, z) correspond to one of the intersecting halfplanes, and b ′ = (c ′ , f ′ ) and (x ′ , y ′ , z ′ ), to the other. If the optimal pair (λ, µ) is on a halfplane H b,(x,y,z) with µ-intercept equal to 1, we select b = b ′ = b, and (x 1 , y 1 , z 1 ) = (x 2 , y 2 , z 2 ) = (x, y, z), and any η ∈ [0, 1].
Next, for the optimal parameters b, b ′ , (x, y, z), (x ′ , y ′ , z ′ ) and η obtained above, we construct a game instance G such that γ(G n B ) = PoA(G). We define two disjoint cycles R 1 = {r 1 , . . . , r n } and R 2 = {r n+1 , . . . , r 2n }. Every r ∈ R 1 has basis b = (c, f ) and v r = η, while every r ∈ R 2 has basis b ′ = (c ′ , f ′ ) and v r = (1 − η). We define the player set N = {1, . . . , n}, where each player i ∈ N has action set A i = {a ne i , a opt i }. In action a ne i , the player i selects x consecutive resources in R 1 starting with r i , i.e. {r i , r (i mod n)+1 , . . . , r ((i+x−2) mod n)+1 }, and x ′ consecutive resources in R 2 starting with resource r n+i . In a opt i , player i selects y consecutive resources in R 1 ending with resource r ((i+z−2) mod n)+1 , i.e. {r ((i+z−y−1) mod n)+1 , . . . , r ((i+z−2) mod n)+1 }, and y ′ consecutive resources in R 2 ending with resource r n+((i+z ′ −2) mod n)+1 . We provide an illustration of this game construction in Fig. 2 . Observe that a ne = (a ne 1 , . . . , a ne n ) satisfies the conditions for a Nash equilibrium, Figure 1 : Illustration of the optimal pair of (λ, µ) in S(G n B ). As described in Part ii) of Theorem 3, the optimal pair of (λ, µ) in S(G n B ) is the point on the boundary of ∩ B,I R (n) H b,(x,y,z) that is tangent to the line with µ-intercept equal to 1 and the most negative slope (the red line in the plot). A valid method of finding this point is described by the blue arrow; begin at λ = max t,y f t (1)y/c t (y) and µ = 1, then follow the south-west boundary until we reach the a halfplane with µ-intercept less than or equal to 1.
which holds by our choice of parameters b, b ′ ∈ B, (x, y, z), (x ′ , y ′ , z ′ ) ∈ I R (n) and η ∈ [0, 1]. As,
where a opt = (a opt 1 , . . . , a opt n ), we conclude that γ(G n B ) = PoA(G) ≤ PoA(G n B ). Part iii): Suppose no point (λ, µ) ∈ S(G n B ) satisfies λ/(1 − µ) = γ(G n B ). First, we will show that there exist b ∈ B and (x, y, z) ∈ I R (n) such that γ(G n B ) = c(x)/c(y) and (y − z)f (x + 1) + zf (x) > xf (x).
Borrowing the notation and reasoning of part ii), we note that the strictest constraint must come from a line corresponding to some basis b = (c, f ) ∈ B that for some values of (x, y, z) ∈ I R (n) has µ-intercept greater than 1, and the least negative slope among all constraints. Since the µ-intercept is greater than 1, (z−x)f (x)+(y−z)f (x+1) > 0, which implies that (y−z)f (x+1)+zf (x) > xf (x). The least negative slope results from selecting y = arg min y∈N c(y) and x = arg max x∈N c(x). Much like in [31, Lem. 5.5], we construct a sequence {(λ k , µ k )} in S(G n B ) such that λ k 1−µ k ↓ γ(G n B ). Since λ/(1 − µ) is increasing in both λ and µ, it can be assumed that every point (λ k , µ k ) lies on the boundary of S(G n B ). The values λ k are bounded from below by the constraints (14) where x = z = 0, and for finite γ (G 
is not attained, the sequence {λ k , µ k } has no limit point. Thus, after some rearranging of (14), for µ k → −∞, 
Figure 2:
The game instance construction G consisting of n players, and two disjoint cycles R 1 and R 2 , as described in Theorem 3, Part ii). Suppose we are given a set of basis pairs B, and positive integer n, and that there exist valuesλ > 0 andμ < 1 for whichλ/(1−μ) = γ(G n B ). Further, suppose that the optimal parameters from Part ii) are b, b ′ ∈ B, (x, y, z) = (4, 2, 0), (x ′ , y ′ , z ′ ) = (3, 4, 2) ∈ I R (n) and η ∈ [0, 1]. In the above figure, we illustrate a game G ∈ G n B with PoA(G) = γ(G n B ), according to the reasoning in Part ii). Observe that each resource r ∈ R 1 has v r = η, and (c r , f r ) = b, whereas each resource r ∈ R 2 has v r = 1 − η, and (c r , f r ) = b ′ . Each player i ∈ N has two actions a ne i and a opt i , as defined in the table on the right. Due to the definitions of the players' actions, every resource in R 1 is selected by 4 players in the allocation a ne = (a ne 1 , . . . , a ne n ), and 3 players in a opt = (a opt 1 , . . . , a opt n ), where no player i ∈ N has a common resource between its actions a ne i and a opt i , i.e., x r = 4 = x, y r = 3 = y, and z r = 0 = z for all r ∈ R 1 . Similarly, x r = 3 = x ′ , y r = 4 = y ′ , and z r = 2 = z ′ , for each resource r ∈ R 2 .
Consider the n-player game G with n resources organized in a cycle, i.e. R = {r 1 , . . . , r n } and N = {1, . . . , n}, where every resource has basis b and value v r = 1. Each agent i ∈ N is endowed with the action set A i = {a ne i , a opt i }; in a ne i , the player selects x consecutive resources starting with r i and ending with r (i+x−2 mod n)+1 , while in a opt i , it selects y consecutive resources ending with r (i+z−2 mod n)+1 . By our choice of parameters, the strategy a ne = (a ne 1 , . . . , a ne n ) is a Nash equilibrium, and PoA(G) = c(x)/c(y) = γ(G n B ), as required.
Computing the price-of-anarchy
Building atop Theorem 3, we now demonstrate how to compute the exact price-of-anarchy for a scalable class of local cost-sharing games via a tractable linear program. 
where 
For ease of notation, and without loss of generality, we set f (0) = f (n + 1) = 0 for all (c, f ) ∈ B.
Proof. We demonstrate that solving the linear program (16) is equivalent to computing the value γ(G n B ) from Theorem 3. In Part i) of the proof of Theorem 3, we show that we need only consider (x, y, z) ∈ I R (n) when calculating γ(G n B ). By substituting ρ = (1 − µ)/λ, and ν = 1/λ into the constraints of (16) , and rearranging, we get
for all (c, f ) ∈ B, and all (x, y, z) ∈ I R (n), which is identical to (14) . Next, observe that maximizing ρ is equivalent to minimizing λ/ (1 − µ) , which concludes the proof. 
Optimizing the price-of-anarchy
We now shift our focus to designing the functions {J i } such that the price-of-anarchy is minimized.
Recall that this problem is relevant to the design of distributed algorithms using the game design approach, when the price-of-anarchy is the performance bound of interest, see the introduction. Observe that, for a given scalable class of local cost-sharing games, designing the player cost functions corresponds to defining the cost-generating functions {f r } r∈R . In the following theorem, we provide a tractable linear program for computing an optimal set of cost-generating functions that minimizes PoA(G n B ). 
is given by the solutions to,
where I R (n) is defined as in (17) . The price-of-anarchy corresponding to the optimal choice of cost-generating functions f opt is PoA(G n B opt ) = max t∈{1,...,m} Proof. Each of the cost-generating functions f opt t minimizes its corresponding PoA(G n {(ct,f )} ) by the following reasoning, borrowed from [37, Thm. 3] . For each function c, we wish to find a function f opt that maximizes ρ in (16) . Such a function is guaranteed to exist by [36, Lem. 5] , and is equivalent to finding the solution to
In order to avoid having to solve a nonlinear program, we can combine ν and f inf (j) := νf (j). We can now merge the two max operators to get
We note thatf opt ∈ R n must be feasible asf opt (j) = νf opt (j), and we know that f opt ∈ R n exists. We further note that PoA(f opt ) = PoA(f opt ) as equilibrium conditions are invariant to scaling.
Thus, the lowest achievable price-of-anarchy is max b∈Bopt {PoA(G n {b} )}. We must have that
holds by the construction of f opt t in [37, Thm. 3] ; the linear program already multiplies the costgenerating function and ν * t , and we show in the proof of Lemma 1 that α t = ν * t for all t ∈ {1, . . . , m} is an optimal set of scaling parameters.
The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 5, but is stated here more generally. 
Welfare-Maximization Games
Although the primary focus of this paper is on cost-minimization problems, many of the results that we have obtained can be analogously derived for welfare-maximization problems. 3 A welfaremaximization problem consists of a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents, where each agent i ∈ N is associated with a finite action set A i . The global objective is to maximize the system's welfare, which is measured by the welfare function W : A → R >0 , i.e. we wish to find the allocation a opt ∈ A, such that a opt ∈ arg max a∈A W (a). As in the previous section, we consider a game-theoretic model where each agent i is associated with a local utility function U i : A → R, which it uses to evaluate its own actions. We represent a welfare-maximization game as a tuple G = (N, A, W, {U i }). Given a welfare-maximization game G, a pure Nash equilibrium is defined as an allocation a ne ∈ A such that U i (a ne ) ≥ U i (a i , a ne −i ) for all a ∈ A i and i ∈ N . The price-of-anarchy in welfare-maximization games is defined similarly to (3) where a lower value of the price-of-anarchy corresponds to an improved performance. We begin with the definition of generalized smoothness for welfare-maximization games and will then provide the analogue of Theorem 1.
Definition 3. The welfare-maximization game G is (λ, µ)-generalized smooth if, for any two allocations a, a ′ ∈ A, there exist λ > 0 and µ > −1 satisfying,
Theorem 6. The price-of-anarchy of a (λ, µ)-generalized smooth, welfare-maximization game G is upper-bounded as,
We define the generalized robust price-of-anarchy of a class of welfare-maximization games G as 
As an analogue to the class of local cost-sharing games, here we introduce a special class of welfare-maximization games, called local utility-allocation games. Games in this class feature a set of resources R, where each resource r ∈ R has a welfare function w r : N → R, and a utilityallocation function f r : N → R. Each player has an associated action set A i ⊆ 2 R . Finally, the system welfare and player utility functions are defined as
As we did with local cost-sharing games, we adopt the convention that w r (0) = 0 for all r ∈ R. We represent a local utility-allocation game as defined above with the tuple G = (N, R, A, {(w r , f r )}). We define the scalable class of local utility-allocation games G n B as the set of all n-player local utilityallocation games, where every resource r ∈ R has (w r , f r ) = (v r w, v r f ) for some pair (w, f ) = b ∈ B = {b 1 , . . . , b m }, and some v r ≥ 0. Within this class the generalized robust price-of-anarchy is a tight upper-bound on pure Nash equilibrium efficiency. Similarly to the result in Theorem 4, we provide the linear program for characterizing the price-of-anarchy of a scalable class of local utility-allocation games.
Theorem 8. For any given set of basis pairs B = {b 1 , . . . , b m }, and for any positive integer n, PoA(G n B ) = W * , where W * is the value of the following linear program,
where we set f (0) = f (n + 1) = 0 for all (w, f ) ∈ B, and I R is defined as in (17).
The linear program in the following theorem returns the optimal price-of-anarchy and the optimal utility-allocation functions of a given scalable class of local utility-allocation games. PoA(G n B(f ) ), is given by the solutions to
where I R (n) is defined as in (17) . The price-of-anarchy corresponding to the optimal choice of utility-allocation functions f opt is PoA(G n B opt ) = max t∈{1,...,m} ρ opt t .
Illustrative Classes of Games
In this section, we illustrate the findings of this manuscript by applying them to three distinct classes of resource-allocation problems studied in the literature.
Price-of-anarchy in atomic congestion games
We consider the framework of atomic congestion games as defined in Example 1. For the purposes of this illustration, we first consider the well-studied class of polynomial congestion games with order d ≥ 1 [48, 32] , and recall that this class is equivalent to the scalable class of local cost-sharing games G n B , with positive integer n, and basis set B = {(x, 1), . . . , (x d+1 , x d )}. Characterizations of the price-of-anarchy for various classes of polynomial congestion games have been derived, in e.g., [31, 47, 48, 32] . Although the bounds provided by the robust price-of-anarchy in congestion games are indeed exact, [47, 48, 32] are forced to use a combination of traditional smoothness arguments, and a nontrivial game construction in order to obtain tight, asymptotic bounds on the price-of-anarchy. In contrast, using the linear program in Theorem 4, the problem of finding tight price-of-anarchy bounds for n-player, polynomial congestion games can be recast into a tractable linear program with two decision variables, ρ = (1 − µ)/λ and ν = 1/λ, and O(n 2 ) constraints, thus requiring no additional analysis. Furthermore, we are able to automatically construct worstcase game instances with n players, and 2n resources. Note that generalized smoothness can be used to produce novel and exact price-of-anarchy results for any basis set B. PoA The plot (left) shows the growth of the price-of-anarchy in the classes of polynomial congestion games with order d ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, as the number of players n is increased from 1 to 10. These exact bounds were obtained using the tractable linear program in Theorem 4 for the class G n B , and basis set B = {(x, 1 x≥1 (x)), . . . , (x d+1 , x d )}. Observe that the price-of-anarchy of each class has already converged to its asymptotic value with n = 6. This is confirmed by the table (right), where we compile the prices-of-anarchy for the classes of 6-player games, and the bounds previously obtained in the literature for classes with infinite players, see [47, 48, 32] . According to Theorem 3, this means that there is a 6-player worst-case game instance with at most 12 resources for every class of polynomial congestion games with order d ∈ {1, . . . , 8}.
the latency functions are assumed to be of the form ℓ e (x) = a e (log(x) + 1), a e ≥ 0 , we have B = {x · (log(x) + 1), log(x) + 1)} and a resulting price-of-anarchy of 1.835.
In Fig. 3 , we plot the evolution of the price-of-anarchy for polynomial congestion games with order d ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, as the number of players n is increased from 1 to 10. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first characterization of the dependence of the price-of-anarchy of polynomial congestion games on the number of players n. We compile the price-of-anarchy bounds for the classes of 6-player, polynomial congestion games in the table of Fig. 3 . We observe that these bounds match the tight, asymptotic bounds on the price-of-anarchy of polynomial congestion games obtained in [47, 48, 32] , reproduced in the table. 5 We provide an example worst-case game instance for the class of 6-player polynomial congestion games with order d = 8 in Fig. 4 .
Covering games
For the next illustration, we consider a generalization of the class of covering games studied in e.g. [17, 18] , which we refer to as κ-coverage games [21] . A κ-coverage game is a local utilityallocation game G with player set N = {1, . . . , n}, resource set R, and postive integer κ. Each resource r ∈ R has an associated value v r ≥ 0, and welfare function w Figure 4 : A worst-case game instance for the class of 6-player polynomial congestion games with order d = 8. As the price-of-anarchy is achieved for finite λ, µ, we follow Theorem 3 Part ii) for the construction. The optimal parameters are b = b ′ = (x 9 , x 8 ), (x, y, z) = (4, 1, 0), (x ′ , y ′ , z ′ ) = (5, 1, 0), and η = 128481 401990 . According to the construction, each player i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} has action set A i = {a ne i , a opt i } as illustrated in the table (right). In the allocation a ne = (a ne 1 , . . . , a ne 6 ), each resource r ∈ R 1 is selected by 4 players, and each resource r ∈ R 2 is selected by 5 players. In the allocation a opt = (a opt 1 , . . . , a opt 6 ), every resource is selected by 1 player. There is no resource in common between actions a ne i and a opt i for any player i ∈ [6] . It is straightforward to verify that a ne is a Nash equilibrium. The system cost imposed by a ne and a opt are C(a ne ) = 273509 401990 ·6·(4) 9 + 128481 401990 ·6·(5) 9 = 4, 815, 615, and C(a opt ) = 273509 401990 · 6 · (1) 9 + 128481 401990 · 6 · (1) 9 = 6, respectively. Their ratio gives C(a ne )/C(a opt ) = 802, 603 ≤ PoA(G n B ). resulting equilibria have the highest possible efficiency. We observe that the class of n-player, κ-coverage games can be captured as the scalable class of local utility-allocation games G n B with basis set B := {(w κ , f )}. We note that κ-coverage games [21] reduce to covering games [17] , when κ = 1. The class of κ-coverage problems can be used to model list-decoding in noisy channels, and combinatorial auctions [21] , while coverage games (κ = 1) find various applications in e.g., sensor allocation problems [12] , job scheduling, facility locations [49] .
[21] study a special class of the κ-coverage problem where all resources r ∈ R are valued equally. In Thm. 1.1 of that work, they show that there exists a centralized, polynomial-time algorithm that returns a distribution σ ∈ ∆(A) whose approximation ratio is bounded by
Informally, (23) guarantees that the distribution σ returned by the algorithm in [21] has expected welfare higher than 1 − κ κ e −κ /κ! times the optimal. We now investigate whether a distributed algorithm could be designed with equilibrium efficiency guarantees close to the ratio in (23) . The following corollary demonstrates that such distributed algorithms exist for any κ-coverage problem, irrespective of whether the resources r ∈ R are valued equally or not. This result emerges as a direct application of the game design approach discussed in the introduction, together with the linear programming framework developed in this manuscript. Figure 5 : The optimal price-of-anarchy in the class of κ-coverage games. In the plot (left), we illustrate the optimal price-of-anarchy for the class of κ-coverage games for values of κ ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, as the number of players is increased from 1 to 25. These optimal prices-of-anarchy, as well as their corresponding optimal utility-allocation functions f opt , were obtained for the welfare function w κ using the tractable linear program in Theorem 9 for each combination of n ∈ {1, . . . , 25}, and κ ∈ {1, . . . , 8}. In Corollary 1, we prove that these optimal price-of-anarchy converge asymptotically to the value ρ * (κ). In the table (right), we observe that the optimal price-of-anarchy matches ρ * (κ) to six or more significant figures, for the classes of 25-player, κ-coverage games considered. Our analysis shows that one can design a distributed algorithm with performance guarantees equal to those of the centralized solution in [21] by coupling our optimal utility-allocation functions f opt with an appropriate distributed learning algorithm.
The inequality holds with equality in the limit as n → ∞. Furthermore, such a utility-allocation function f * is recursively defined as f * (1) = 1, and f * (x + 1) = min{x, n − κ} min{κ, n − x} f * (x) − min{x, κ} min{κ, n − x} ρ * (κ) + κ min{κ, n − x} , ∀x ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}.
Proof. The proof is reported in Appendix A.
In Fig. 5 , we provide a characterization of the optimal price-of-anarchy in κ-coverage games for κ ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, as the number of players n is increased from 1 to 25 by solving the linear program in Theorem 9. Observe that the optimal price-of-anarchy for the classes of 25-player, κ-coverage games matches ρ * (κ) to six significant figures. By Theorem 2, the upper-bound ρ * (κ) extends to the efficiency of all average coarse-correlated equilibria. Thus, by pairing the player utilities derived from the function f * with any distributed learning algorithm capable of computing an average coarse-correlated equilibrium (or coarse-correlated equilibrium), one obtains a fully-distributed algorithm with identical approximation guarantees to the centralized solution proposed in [21] .
Probabilistic-objective games
Our final illustrative example focuses on a well-studied class of welfare-maximization games, that we term probabilistic-objective games [50, 20, 51] . A probabilistic-objective game is a local utilityallocation game G with player set N = {1, . . . , n}, and set of resources R. Each resource r ∈ R represents an objective that has an associated value v r ≥ 0, probability of failure q r ∈ [0, 1], and welfare w r (x) = v r w qr (x), where
Intuitively, if more players select the same resource r ∈ R, its contribution to the system welfare increases, albeit with diminishing returns. Similar to κ-coverage games, the utility-allocation functions correspond to f r (x) = v r f qr (x) for all r ∈ R, where each function f qr : N → R is a free design parameter. Similar to the previous example, the goal is to design each function f qr in order to maximize the efficiency of the resulting equilibria. Observe that the class of n-player probabilistic-objective games is captured by the scalable class of local utility-allocation games G n B , with basis set B = {(w q 1 , f q 1 ), . . . , (w qm , f qm )}, where Q = {q 1 , . . . , q m } are the probabilities of failure for the different types of resources. In the literature, problems such as animal dispersal in a common environment [50] , credit assignment in group research projects [20] , and vehicle-target assignment [51] have all been modelled under this common game structure.
[20] design utility-allocation functions for a class of probabilistic-objective games that optimize the robust price-of-anarchy as a surrogate to optimizing the true price-of-anarchy. The class of games they consider restricts resources to a single probability of failure q ∈ [0, 1], i.e., q r = q for all r ∈ R. The equilibrium efficiency guarantee achieved by [20] is 2, which is the optimal robust price-of-anarchy for q = 0. Instead, using our approach, we are able to design utilityallocation functions that directly optimize the price-of-anarchy using Theorem 9, achieving an improved efficiency guarantee of e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.582 < 2, which is the optimal price-of-anarchy for q = 0. Optimizing the robust price-of-anarchy for any value of q ∈ [0, 1] results in worse efficiency guarantees than those obtained by directly optimizing the price-of-anarchy, see Fig. 6 .
We observe that, by Part iv. of Proposition 1, the robust price-of-anarchy is optimized by the equal-shares utility-allocation function, f es r (x) = w r (x)/x for all r ∈ R. This is because the equal-shares function is the unique utility-allocation function for which for all a ∈ A. Thus, the price-of-anarchy achieved by optimizing the robust price-of-anarchy can be computed using the linear program in Theorem 8, for the basis set B = {(w q , w q (x)/x)}. In the left plot of Fig. 6 , we observe that the optimal robust price-of-anarchy is strictly greater than the optimal price-of-anarchy in probabilistic-objective games for all values of q ∈ [0, 1). On the right, we plot the functions f opt and f es for two values of q ∈ [0, 1]. Although they are both nonincreasing and convex, the differences between the optimal, and equal-shares utility-allocation functions cause the gap in prices-of-anarchy observed in the left plot. As previously noted, a set of optimal utility-allocation functions for a class of probabilistic-objective games with different probabilities of failure q ∈ Q can be obtained by deriving an optimal utility-allocation function for each function w q . Further, the optimal price-of-anarchy for the entire class of games is dictated by the worst-performing resource type. In a class of probabilistic-objective games, the worst-performing resource type has the lowest probability of failure.
Conclusion
In this work, we sought to improve our capabilities in computing and optimizing the price-of-anarchy in games. The end goal was to use our new insights to inform the design of agent utility functions as part of the game design approach. Toward this end, we first introduced the generalized smoothness framework, which we showed is more widely applicable, and provides more precise price-of-anarchy bounds when compared to the standard smoothness approach of [31] . Next, we prove that by using a generalized smoothness argument one obtains the exact price-of-anarchy for the class of scalable local cost-sharing/utility-allocation games. Finally, we show that the problems of computing the price-of-anarchy, and optimizing the price-of-anarchy over the players' cost/utility functions can Plot left. The prices-of-anarchy corresponding to the optimal utility-allocation functions designed using the traditional, and generalized smoothness frameworks for classes of 25-player probabilisticobjective games with q r = q, for all r ∈ R. We have plotted these bounds against the one obtained using a traditional smoothness argument in [20, Thm. 2.7] (i.e., PoA ≤ (2n − 1)/n). The optimal robust prices-of-anarchy are computed using the linear program in Theorem 8, for the choice of utility-allocation function f es (j) = w q (j)/j. These are plotted as PoA es . The optimal prices-of-anarchy, and corresponding optimal utility-allocation functions {f opt }, are computed using Theorem 9, and are denoted as PoA opt . Plots middle and right. The utility-allocation functions f opt and f es for classes of 25-player probabilistic-objective games with q ∈ {0.5, 0.75}.
be posed as tractable linear programs. We showcased the strength and breadth of our approach by recovering many existing results devoted to the quantification of the price-of-anarchy. We have also shown how the game design approach can be coupled with the linear programming framework developed here so as to design novel distributed algorithms equipped with performance guarantees. This approach finds application to relevant and well-studied classes problems. We note that the price-of-anarchy represents but one of many metrics for measuring algorithm performance. Future work should be devoted to analyzing the potential losses in performance with respect to other metrics when designing algorithms with the best achievable price-of-anarchy.
